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Abstract: this paper combines the economic concept of specific investment with anthropological evidence 
on three early human societies –the disbanding groups of pre-anatomically modern humans, the hunter-
gatherers’ egalitarian communities, and the primitive states or chiefdoms. This combination is aimed to 
provide a single framework for thinking of the institutional evolution of their political organizations and, 
therefore, of the associated mode of regulation of violence and distribution. Specifically, I examine a circular 
causation mechanism by which exogenous ‘technological’ conditions determine the basic type of economic 
activity together with the associated degree of investments’ specificity. The resulting safeguards are 
expressed in political terms and, in turn, the way these political organizations regulate the level of violence in 
the society  implements a distribution of goods and power  which has the effect of reinforcing the initial kick 
in terms of the economic structure. Thus, at the cost of some loss in formal sophistication, the paper stresses 
the two-way link between the economical, the political and the distributional sphere, and discusses group-
level mechanisms to restrain behaviour that –exogenous to every individual in the group but endogenous to 
groups’ behaviour- are not caught by conventional modelling about the origins of order.    
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1.  Introduction 
 
Since the seminal contributions by Williamson (1975, 1985) and Klein et al. 
(1978), the concept of specific investment played a major role in the transaction 
cost approach to the theory of the firm, one of the first coherent and operational 
attempts to find a functional explanation for the existence of explicit hierarchies in 
the economic realm. By definition, when an investment is specific to a particular 
relationship, it is attributed with a quasi-rent, that is, an extra value over the next 
best alternative use. Since contracts are necessarily incomplete, however, such 
quasi-rent can be taken away from the original investor  because of the so-called 
‘hold-up’ problem. This is why the central proposition of the approach is that, 
while generic relationships can be optimally regulated by the market, specific 
relationships must be regulated by authoritarian relationships such as those 
prevailing in the firm in order to ensure the appropriate safeguards against the risk 
of expropriation.  
Extending  this framework to multilateral relationships, in Battistini (2001, 
2004) I developed a notion of ‘group-specificity’ by which an investment is group-
specific when it is specific to a (finite) set of relationships, but generic within the 
same set1. Accordingly, the most convenient organizational form for this kind of 
investment was individuated in the group relationships typically associated with 
the clusters of firms in industrial districts. Indeed, the basic empirical ‘fact’ that 
                                                 
1 This is just but one notion of ‘intermediate’ specificity. Others have been introduced by Williamson 
(1991) and Menard (1996) to explain hybrid governance structures between the market and the 
vertically integrated firm. See also the analysis of the German ‘unionized capitalism’ in Pagano, 1991.                                                                    2 
motivated the analysis was the combination between market and non-market 
relationships summarized by Piore and Sabel with the notion of ‘flexible 
specialization’: ‘[Under flexible specialization] No firm or individual has a right to 
any particular place within the community, but all have a claim to some place 
within in’. (Piore and Sabel, 1984, p.269). 
Because of the Coasean separation between distribution and efficiency, this   
theory has proven more successful in explaining relationships between firms rather 
than employer-employees relationships (Joskow, 1985)2.  As emphasized by 
radical economics (Marglin, 1974; Stone, 1974), when wealth effects cannot be 
assumed away, the other direction of causality –that from property rights to 
technology- may be at work and a conflict-based explanation in which (specific) 
investments flow from contractual safeguards obtains. More realistically, then, it 
has been possible to make clear how the self-reinforcing nature of the relationships 
between these two directions of causality implies ‘organizational equilibria’ 
attributed with stability but not with efficiency properties (Pagano and Rowthorn, 
1994; see also Belloc and Pagano, 2005)3. 
                                                 
2 In a multilateral setting, in any case, claims to overall efficiency in reaping the benefits of the 
investments are also undermined by a necessary but uncommon ‘non replicability’ condition. See 
Battistini, 2001, 2004 
3 Interestingly, under the label of  ‘productive forces’ and ‘production relationships’ these directions 
of causality were both present in Marx and, in fact, by substituting ‘technology’ with ‘stratification’ 
and ‘property rights’ with ‘central government’, a similar ‘chicken-and-egg’ controversy between 
conflict-based and functionalist theories is also present in the anthropological literature about the origin 
of the State (see Fried, 1978, and Service, 1975). As will clearer in Section 2, even in this case a 
systemic approach which does not restrict itself to mono-causal explanations seems more apt to convey 
the idea of the complexity of the phenomenon (see, for example, Coehn, 1978a,b).                                                                      3 
While Transaction Cost Economics and the subsequent Property Rights Approach4 
did employ the concept of specificity to give account of different ownership patterns 
including political and social organizations such as the State and NGOs (Hart, 
Shleifer, and Visnhy, 1997; Williamson, 2000; Besley and Gathak, 2001), adopting 
the more general perspective just mentioned, in this paper I try to relate it to three 
archaic political forms and, specifically, to the way they represented a solution to the 
problem of controlling violence and implementing the associated mode of distribution 
of goods and power in the society. These three early human societies are the 
disbanding groups of pre-Anatomically Modern Humans, the hunter-gatherers’ 
egalitarian communities, and the ancient states or chiefdoms. They have been chosen 
not only because human evolution passed through them in a rough temporal sequence, 
with elements of the former passing to the next,  but also because -it goes without 
saying- they are so different from market societies in having a substantial part of 
economic behavior heavily embedded in socio-political relations.  
The line of reasoning is as follows: before the emergence of symbolic culture (i.e., 
the conceptualization and the transmission of information beyond the here-and-now 
(Whallon, 1989)),  economic investments and talents of the people cannot be but 
generic with respect to both other people and the land they lived on. Having the exit 
option available at no cost, individuals were not interested in requiring special 
safeguards and probably lived in disorganic agglomerations comparable to those of 
                                                 
4 See Hart (1995).                                                                    4 
the contemporary great African apes who share with us a common ancestor5 . What 
we call now an Hobbesian state of nature with its characteristic ‘violence of all 
against all’ probably prevailed, while innate physical differences among individuals, 
together with the strict operation of fission-fusion mechanisms, possibly determined 
the distribution of goods and power in the ‘society’.  
By contrast, when people became able to communicate effectively and to take 
collective decision such as, for example, where to migrate to hunt what, economic 
investments and talents were specific to the group in the sense above. Hunting a 
particular animal in a particular place, in addition, is both an activity associated with 
intrinsic difficulties in attributing individual merit and a positional activity in the 
sense that what one catches decreases directly what the others can catch. 
Consequently, it is reasonable that people demanded appropriate safeguards in the 
form of the egalitarian distribution (sharing of large game meat) and politics (curbing 
of tendencies to upstartism and free-riding)  typically attributed with hunter-gatherers 
communities, as well as a mode of regulation of violence in the form of collective 
moralistic aggression against deviants (Boehm, 1999)6.  
Finally, well after people became sedentary practicing agriculture and domestication 
of animals, and individual property rights proliferated so that mobility was no more a 
                                                 
5 The method of triangulating to the human nature by attributing to the common ancestor (CA) the 
characteristics possessed by all its descendants (the existing African great apes such as gorillas, 
chimpanzee and bonobos, and the better known human societies of the past), has been introduced by 
Wrangham (1987), and is reported in the next section. Interesting comparative analysis of human and 
non-human primates’ economies have recently hosted by the Journal of Bioeconomics. See (Pryor, 
2003, and Boehm, 2004). 
6 The use of the term ‘moralistic aggression’ may be confusing because in his original article Trivers 
(1971) does not admit neither individual net detriment nor group advantage.  The adjective ‘collective’, 
instead, makes an inevitable reference to the problem of free-riding. See the next footnote.                                                                     5 
viable option, economic investments and resources  became sufficiently differentiated 
and bilaterally specific to particular pieces of land to require a sort of ‘coerced 
exchange’ between legitimacy and the formal protection provided by primitive states 
in the form of ‘organized violence’ (written codes; military, judiciary and  religious 
apparatuses). In addition to allowing for economic specialization,  storable surplus 
from agriculture, in effect, meant that the particular type of distribution chosen among 
the many possible (usually, subsistence for peasants and residual claiming for the 
ruling elite) had to be enforced by formal coercion (Gellner, 1989).  
Thus, the argument is not only economic in the usual sense of applying the 
methodology of individual choices under constraints, but also in the more classical 
sense of uncovering the two-way link between the economical, the political and the 
distributional sphere. The only assumption which is eventually contested is that of 
unconstrained self-interest, for the choice to make group-specific investments is 
undermined by the  free-riding attitude economists and socio-biologists are both keen 
to stress7. As group-specificity decrease variation within the group and increases 
variation between groups, however, such ‘self-defeating’ choices and the ensuing 
                                                 
7  This is of course another delicate issue. In general, biologists are inclined to think that every 
behavior –even those seemingly altruistic- can be parsimoniously explained by an appropriate 
definition of self-interest -the best example being the notion of self-deception for the theory of indirect 
reciprocity (Alexander, 1987), when kin selection (Hamilton, 1963) or reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 
1971) are not enough. Perhaps with minor psychological sophistication, the same is true of economists’ 
game-theoretic analysis of trust and cooperation (but see Kreps, 1990). However, another group of 
theorists  tend to admit the co-existence of purely selfish with other-directed motives and behaviors, as 
well as the view of  selection as a multilevel process (see, for instance, the collected essays in 
Hammerstein, 2002). Interpreting –as I partly do-  group-specificity-based  institutional mechanisms as 
cognitive constraints in the process of self-understanding may blur the line between the two schools but 
it is only a way to avoid the other big scientific divide in social sciences, between structuralism and 
individualism (see Hodgson, 1998; Fehr and Gintis, 2004; Greif, 2005). Another interpretation is that 
self-sacrifice in hunter-gatherers’ societies may be the very price to be paid in order to gain complete                                                                    6 
enforcing mechanisms can be seen as evolved under the conditions favouring group-
selection over individual-selection (Wilson and Sober, 1994; Sober and Wilson, 1998; 
Bowles et al. 2003).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I present the 
relevant anthropological and historical evidence about the above three stages of the 
human evolution. Section 3 contains a very simple characterization of the proposed 
circular relationship between specificity, political organizations, and regulation of 
violence and distribution. Section 4 briefly concludes. 
 
2.  Anthropological theories and evidence. 
 
Usually, formal modelling about the origins of order skips the Paleolithic stage and 
tackles directly the step from a blank slate state of nature to an organized society8. To 
be sure, the explicit analysis of the ‘dark-side’ of economics (a result in its own) 
permits this literature to produce a number of novel and interesting results with 
respect to both neoclassical orthodoxy and the incomplete contracts approach. 
Included are the relationship between power and distribution (Hirshleifer, 1991; 
1995), the possibility that institutions emerge from exploitation rather than Pareto-
                                                                                                                                            
individual autonomy (Gardner, 1991). A full treatment of the issue, however, is outside the scope of the 
paper, as is an accurate definition of anarchy as a social arrangement.  
8 The literature is known  as the economics of conflict (Hirshleifer, 2001). Starting from the basic 
trade-off between productive and predatory activities, the emergence of an ordered society results from 
(exogenous) domination of one party over the other, or from a ‘contractarian’ approach in which the 
positive incentives deriving from certainty of property rights (or the reduction of destructive violence) 
are balanced against the potential despotism of the ‘king’ (or  simply the dilution of incentives to work 
deriving from the duty to pay taxes). The key parameters which regulate such trade-offs are the 
technology of conflict (Hisrchleifer, 1991, 1995; Grossman, 2002), differences in productive and/or 
fighting abilities (Muthoo, 2004; Skaperdas, 1992), the interest rate (Bates, Greif, and Singh, 2002; 
Muthoo, 2004), and the characteristics of the distribution of the resources (Hirschleifer, 1991, 1995; 
Baker, 2003).                                                                    7 
efficient exchanges (Skaperdas, 1992; Moselle and Pollack, 2001), and the state as a 
solution to the collective action problem of providing defense against predation 
(Grossman, 2002), or as a regulator of the trade-off between peace and prosperity 
(Bates, Greif, and Singh, 2002). In addition to reproducing as unbridgeable the divide 
between conflict-based and integrative theories, however, because of the 
methodological commitment to self-interested maximization and diminishing returns, 
the same literature has problems in dealing with group behaviour9. More generally, 
such a methodological commitment does not allow the treatment of cultural or 
cognitive mechanisms to manage power, meaning institutional constraints on 
behaviour different from both strict competition and plain coercion. For this reason 
the jump above seems a big jump not only historically for it hides about 90.000 to 
30.000 years -a period of time well sufficient to create a new species10-, but also 
logically because it hides the stage where such mechanisms originated and passed to 
the subsequent ones -think, for example, of the theories of inter-group warfare as 
determinant of emergence of the state (Carneiro, 1970) and of human sociality 
(Alexander, 1987)11. 
                                                 
9Recent attempts to analyse coalition formation deliver contrasting results. According to Garfinkel 
(2004) the free-rider problem in the collective action setting of group formation reduces the intensity of 
conflict and, thus, has beneficial effects on the stability of alliances, for it offsets the traditional 
depressive effect of lessened appropriability. Esteban and Sacòvics (2002), however, show that the 
result is not robust with respect to the analysis of individual differences, particularly when represented 
by parameters like the vicinity of interests and/or differential strength. 
10 According to E.O. Wilson (1978, p. 91) substantial changes can occur in the span of less than 100 
generations, while two thousand generations are enough create a new species and to mold organisms’ 
anatomy and behaviour in major ways. As a human generation is a relatively lengthy twenty-five years, 
the neglected period covers about one to three thousand generations. See also Boehm, 1999, ch. 9.  
11 The affinity with socio-economic concepts like rationality as the capacity to recognize socially 
shared  meanings (Durkeim, 1950), docility (Simon, 1990), or internalization of norms (Gintis, 2003) 
suggests they are  relevant for modern societies, too.                                                                    8 
  As mentioned in the Introduction, this stage is that of egalitarian hunter-
gatherers communities and, needless to say, it has been at the centre of   
anthropological research for entire decades. Basically, such communities are 
described as small size, mobile and relatively flexibly composed groups, deeply 
cooperating in hunting and regularly sharing large game meat, with well specified 
informal political mechanisms to curb innate tendencies to  self-assertion and free-
riding (Boehm, 1999; Knauft, 1991). For the sake of clarity, explanations of their 
egalitarian character can be classified as ecological, economical and political.  To the 
first group belong theories emphasizing the importance of small numbers and 
mobility (Turnbull, 1965), especially in relation to the seasonal and scattered 
character of the distribution of resources (Salzman, 1979). Economic explanations 
obviously focus on the characteristics of hunting, stressing the non storability 
condition and therefore the actuarial convenience of sharing (Fried, 1967) and, at least 
as interestingly for what follows, the lack of specialization in economic production 
(Gluckman, 1965).  Arguing that ecological and economical factors are certainly 
important but too specific to give account of a phenomenon observed worldwide in 
different periods including the present, political explanations underline the concept of 
intentionality and make reference to an ‘egalitarian syndrome or ideology’ which 
would relate innate tendencies to dominance and submission to an equally powerful 
resentment to be dominated, resulting in the so-called ‘reverse dominance hierarchies’ 
(Boehm, 1993). As a consequence, in this approach the viability of the egalitarian 
characteristics –sharing of large game meat, consensual decision making and the 
substantial absence of leadership and social stratification- is explicitly connected to                                                                    9 
the existence of morally motivated and collectively enforced levelling mechanisms 
which, depending on the circumstances, pre-empt or punish deviant behaviours 
(ridicule, public opinion, ostracism, execution)12.  
Notably, though theories underlining kin selection (Earle and Johnson, 1987) or 
individualistic motives to share (Blurton-Jones, 1984) do exist, an analysis of the pre-
adaptations that have made possible this stage of the human evolution (lethal 
weapons, communication capacity, a disposition to think morally) seems able to 
discard them. Such pre-adaptations, in fact, for the most part are also the foundations 
of the emergence of symbolic culture and, therefore, of the uniqueness of humans in 
being submitted to the pressure of cultural and group selection, in addition to the 
universal operation of natural and individual selection (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, 
1990; Enrich, 2004)13. 
                                                 
12 The cognitive elements of such mechanisms can be appreciated with the following quotation from 
Lee (1979, pp. 244-246, reported in Boehm, 1999, p. 45) about the culture of the !Kung: ‘Say that a 
man has been hunting. He must not come home and announce like a braggart, “I have killed a big one 
in the bush!”. He must first sit down in silence until I or someone else comes up to his fire and asks, 
“What  did you see today?” He replies quietly, “Ah, I’m no good for hunting. I saw nothing at 
all..maybe just a tiny one.” Then I smile to myself because I now know he has killed something big.’. 
Another group member, in fact, is keen to add (ibidem): ‘When a  young man kills much meat, he 
comes to think of himself as a chief or  a big man, and he thinks of the rest of us as his servants or 
inferiors. We can’t accept this. We refuse one who boasts, for someday his pride will make him to kill 
somebody. So we always speak of his meat as worthless. In this way we cool his heart and make him 
gentle.’. The quotation also illuminate that, though obviously originating from individuals, such 
cognitive constraints on self-understanding are at the same time exogenous to every individual in the 
group, and can be seen as emerging from the interaction between the micro-foundations of groups and 
the macro-foundations of individuals, with tradition as the obvious candidate to fill the temporal gap. 
Other, more theoretically inclined explanations of cooperation in similar settings have been advanced 
in terms of costly signaling (Gintis et al., 2001), low cost of punishment (Boyd et al., 2003), and a 
predisposition to incur the cost of punishment without expectation of reward (Gintis et al., 2003). For a 
Machiavelli-inspired  interpretation of the point, instead, see Erdal and Whiten (1994).    
13 Whallon (1989) has an interesting point in this respect. It wasn’t technological innovation but 
symbolic culture and its expression in language that permitted the expansion of hunter-gatherers of the 
late Paleolithic in difficult regions such as the Siberia and Australia. To move there, in fact, it was 
indispensable to possess and circulate reliable and accurate information about the availability of mates 
and material resources.                                                                     10 
  If this perspective is accepted, then the next step is to look for the 
characteristics of the stage which preceded the appearance of symbolic culture. Here, 
lacking uncontroversial ethnographic and archaeological evidence, the most agreed 
method is that of triangulating to the human nature by attributing to the common 
ancestor (CA) the traits possessed by all its descendants, the existing great African 
apes who share with us a substantial part of the DNA structure14, and the better known 
human societies of the past (Wrangham, 1987). The method is conservative because 
otherwise these commonly possessed traits would have had to appear two times 
independently, and it generally challenges the linear evolutionary trajectory postulated 
by socio-biologists with respect to despotism and inequality, outlining instead the 
possibility of a U-shaped form for the evolution from the CA to the first sedentary 
human agglomerations (Knauft, 1991). In any case, since hunter-gatherers societies 
have been treated above and primitive States or chiefdoms will be treated below, now 
it remains to report what primatologists mostly agree to attribute to the social life of 
gorillas (gorilla gorilla), chimpanzees (pan troglodytes), and bonobos (pan paniscus), 
that is, to describe the economics (food procurement and distribution) and politics 
(dominance relationships) of their group living15.  
  As is well known, the gorillas are the species which diverged first from the 
CA (8 millions years ago). Its social group is composed of a silverback and its harem 
                                                 
14 The -astonishing - percentages range from about 90% to more than 98%. 
15 The other relevant dimension of their social life is of course sexuality. See Battistini and Pagano 
(2004) for an analysis of how the differences in the incentive properties of our mating systems in 
comparison with those  of our closest relatives, together with the complentarities between natural and 
sexual selection, may have lead to the development of uniquely human faculties including language 
and (emotional and rational) intelligence. While in that paper females’ selective sexual receptivity was                                                                    11 
of females and, less infrequently of what is commonly thought, of some subordinate 
(often younger) males (Harcourt, 1979; Fossey, 1983). Their diet exclusively consists 
of foliage and food sharing is virtually unknown, even in mother-son relationships 
(Fossey, 1979; Jolly, 1985). By the same token, coalitional behaviour is basically 
absent and encounters between males have an invariantly violent character which 
does not permit of distinguishing between intra- and inter-group relationships.   
Politically, social life is therefore dominated by the silverback, who leads the group in 
the timing and direction of its movements  and aggressively defends it against strange 
males (Watts, 1996).  
Things are different as far the chimpanzees are concerned. They are the best studied 
species, and live in mixed sex groups with a clear and definite dominance hierarchy 
from the α -male to middle and low rank males (Goodall, 1986; Nishida, 1990; 
Boesch, 1996). They predominantly  eat vegetables but hunted animals make a non 
trivial part of their diet. Except from mother-son relationships, food sharing is not 
widely practised even though in some rare case it is used to ease occasional conflicts 
(Nishida, 1970; Mc Grew, 1979; De Wall, 1989). Intra-group relationships are 
generally quite relaxed because of the peace-keeping role of the α -male, but 
periodically subordinate males form coalitions to challenge the dominant individual 
and substitute it with a challenger (Nishida, Hosaka, 1996). Inter-group relationships, 
instead, are inevitably more violent and aggressive but the relative attractiveness of 
                                                                                                                                            
shown to have profound impact on the results, in what follows attention is mostly paid to male 
relationships.                                                                     12 
the contested resources does not seem to play and important role (Manson and 
Wrangham,  1991).   
While their pacific and non violent character is increasingly disputed, the bonobos –
diverged from the CA together with chimpanzees about 5 millions years ago, and 
from chimps 1-2 millions years ago- have a social structure very different from their 
nearest cousin. The ‘political scene’ is dominated by female-based coalitional 
behaviour, and intra-group violence is virtually absent (White, 1996; Hohman, Futh, 
2002). Food sharing is at its peak among the discussed species and it is frequently 
exchanged against sexual favours, both in homosexual and heterosexual relationships 
(Badrian and Bardian, 1984; Kano, 1983, 1990; Fruth, Hohman, 2002) . Data are still 
insufficient to assess inter-group relationships, even though previously neglected 
wounds are increasingly observed, testifying for the possibility of a less friendly 
character and a less marked difference from chimpanzees (Boesch, 2002; White, 
1996).  
  From this possibly oversimplified summary, then, which characteristics can be 
attributed to the CA? Since, as stated, they must be present in all the descendants, 
humans included, it seems plausible and conservative enough to derive that the CA’s 
social structure was a semi-closed group with a clear (probably male-based) 
dominance hierarchy,  regulated by arms-length relationships and fission-fusion   
mechanisms made operational by a considerable presence of lone males travelling 
from one group to another. Food procurement basically consisted of gathered 
vegetables, with a very scarce possibility of sharing, possibly except from mother-son 
relationships. Accordingly, coalitional behaviour could be present but barely besides                                                                    13 
very strict kin relationships, and there is no indication that the rule was different from 
competitive and unsupportive relations. There is no doubt, on the other hand, that 
violence dominated encounters between strangers, whether or not group composition 
permitted to discriminate between intra- and inter-group relationships. Very 
importantly for what follows, finally, it has to be said that stability of such groups is 
very difficult to assess since it surely depended on the resources distribution (which is 
not known with certainty), but it is to be excluded that resources other from the sexual 
ones, and especially territoriality as such, were defended against intruders 
(Wrangham, 1987).   
  To conclude this review of the anthropological evidence and theories about the 
three stages of human evolution which the paper is concerned with, the last step is the 
discussion of the process of state formation, i.e., the stage which naturally attracted 
most of the scholars’ attention. According to the perspective of the paper, among the 
various distinguishing features which define the essence of state organization (the 
monopoly in the use of force, the appearance of social stratification, a functional 
hierarchy) the most appropriate one seems the substitution of fission as a mechanism 
to regulate conflict during the life-cycle of social groups: ‘All political systems except 
true states break up into similar units as part of their normal process of political 
activity. Hunting bands, locally autonomous food producers, and chieftaincies each 
build up the polity to some critical point and hen send off subordinate segments to 
found new units or split because of conflict over succession, land shortage, failure by 
one segment to support another in intergroup competition or hostilities, or for some 
other reason. These new units grow in their turn, and split again. The state is a system                                                                    14 
specifically designed to restrain such tendencies (Coehn, 1978a, p. 8, enphasis 
added).  
In turn, the focus on the substitution of fission as the key diagnostic trait of the 
passing to state organization clearly makes a reference –as a necessary condition, if 
not a sufficient one16- to the full development of agriculture and sedentarism on the 
side of economic structure, with the co-evolving proliferation of individual property 
rights critically combining with geographical barriers in restraining people’s mobility 
(see Allen, 1997, and Bowles and Choi, 2003).  
In this way, it is then possible to accommodate the different single-cause 
theories which have been variously proposed,  every one with its favoured confirming 
example but with an –equally easy to find- appropriate falsifying counterexample. So, 
for instance,  it is possible to appreciate the validity of the population pressure 
approach, both in its variant stressing the accumulation of property rights in key 
resources by a ruling elite, which extracted labour from peasants in exchange for 
access to essential land, protection from outside dangers and various benefits from 
central organization (Johnson and Earle, 1978; Earle, 1991). Or in the attractive 
variant of the circumscription theory, by which early States emerged in 
geographically circumscribed areas of Latin America and Middle East as a result of 
                                                 
16 Notably, between the advent of agriculture and the emergence of primitive states there is a gap of 
about 4000 years. On the one hand, this emphasizes the role of the slow co-evolution of property rights 
in restraining fission while, on the other, it has allowed a limited number of sedentary societies to 
remain egalitarian (see Boehm, 1999, ch.  5). The hypothesis that the passing to agriculture was 
determined by climate change is contained in Richerson, Boyd, and Bettinger (2001). AN important 
distinction in the debate about the origins of the state is that between primary and secondary states (See 
Price, 1978).                                                                    15 
the joint effect of external conquest and the impossibility to fly to other lands by the 
conquered peasants (Carneiro, 1970).  
Moreover, the reference to the combination between the full development of 
agriculture and the design of the mechanisms to restrain fission, with surplus, storage, 
and specialization commanding the addition of coercion to culture to implement a 
particular distribution among the many possible and, ultimately, to close the circle 
between community and meaning (Gellner, 1989),  relate also to the two previous and 
most respected anthropological approaches to the evolution of primitive States, 
associated to the names of Service (1975) for the functional tradition and Fried (1978) 
for the Marx-inspired conflict tradition. In the first case, the increased complexity of 
the social life creates the need of centralized organization –the best example being the 
irrigation problem (Hunt and Hunt, 1976)-, and the resulting social stratification 
between a ruling elite and a ruled mass is seen as a voluntarily accepted and a 
basically legitimated consequence of that –the best example being the supernatural 
powers attributed to the king (Coe, 1981).  In the second, on the contrary, social 
stratification, intended as the result of competition for unequal access to scarce 
resources, is found as the first mover, with State organization –both in its practical 
and super-structural aspects- interpreted as the necessary instrument to perpetuate the 
conquered privileges for the ruling class (see also Haas, 1981).  
As discussed in the Introduction with reference to the theory of the capitalistic 
firm, and even more in the case of the origins of the State because of its more 
universal character, however, it seems that single-cause theories are not really able to 
do their job, for it is even too easy to find elements of every one of them in the actual                                                                    16 
historical examples. Naturally,  none of the relevant theorists is so naïve to deny such  
co-existence and the issue ends up by revolving around temporal primacy. It is, 
however, precisely this sequential timing that case material from history and 
ethnography tends to inevitably present in different ways in different times and 
places17. A more prudent and reality respectful perspective, therefore, can be found in 
the so-called systemic approach, that is, an approach recognizing that: ‘It is now 
becoming clear that there are multiple roads to statehood, that whatever sets off the 
process tends as well to set off other changes which, no matter how different they are 
to begin with, all tend to  produce similar results. It is this similarity of result, I 
believe, that has clouded the issue of causality. (…) . The reason for this is clear. 
Once a society begins to evolve more centralized and more permanent authority 
structures, the political realm itself becomes an increasingly powerful determinant of 
change in the economy, society, and culture of the system. After the tendency to 
centralized control has triggered, the hierarchical structure itself becomes a selective 
determinant that feeds back to all the sociocultural features to make them fit more 
closely into its overall pattern.’ (Coehn, 1978a, p . 8, emphasis added).  
In this sense, the circular relationship between economical, political and 
distributional aspects introduced in the next section may seem a useful theoretical 
generalization. 
                                                 
17For example, in the three episodes of state formation in the Chad basin in north-eastern Nigeria 
studied by Coehn (1978b), the first two, referring to Borno and Combina, are an instance of a military 
success of nomads over sedentary agriculturalists, testifying for a conflict-based approach because of 
the primacy of social stratification (the nomads were also successful in insisting on monopolize key 
positions soon after, indeed). The latter, however, the Pabir-Biu case, is an instance of a sedentary 
agriculturalist people without  pre-existing social stratification that developed a state-like organization                                                                    17 
‘TECHNOLOGICAL’ 
SHOCK 
ECONOMICS  POLITICS 
SPECIFICITY  SAFEGUARDS 
DISTRIBUTION 
VIOLENCE  3.  Analysis 
 
In this section I present the  proposed  relationships 
between specificity, political organizations, and the associated modes of regulation 
of violence and distribution. More precisely, exogenous ‘technological’ conditions 
(occasional benefits from group living –e.g. defense against predation-, 
communication abilities, climate changes) determine the basic type of economic 
activity (gathering, hunting, agriculture) and the required specificity of the 
investments (generic, group-specific, bilaterally specific). The resulting safeguards 
are expressed in political terms (Hobbesian state of nature, egalitarianism, state 
organization), and in turn the way these political organizations regulate the level of 
violence in the society (‘violence of all against all’, collective moralistic 
aggression, ‘organized violence’) implements a particular distribution of  goods 
and power in the society (individual  net productivity, sharing of large game meat, 
subsistence and residual claiming), which reinforces the initial kick in terms of the 






                                                                                                                                            
on its own, to  defend its territory. Naturally, even in this case there are external pressures but the 
benefits from centralization seem to come first.                                                                     18 
‘TECHNOLOGICAL’ 
SHOCK 
ECONOMICS  POLITICS 











Introduced only for expositional convenience, the equations below are a 
variation on a famous and appropriate model by  Vehrencamp (1983), which 
analyzes the egalitarian vs despotic character of a given society by studying the 
allocation of resources between a dominant individual and a group of subordinate 
individuals. While in her original model she makes such allocation dependent on 
exogenous ecological factors such as group size and the availability of alternative 
patches, which in turn determine the benefit of group living and the cost of 
dispersal, in the following I make the cost and benefit of group living dependent on 
the production and the enforcement functions, which in turn are determined by the 
above exogenous ‘technological’ factors. Despite these and other modifications to 
be introduced below, however, the model continues to share with Vehrencamp’s 
the characteristic of being a zero sum game optimization model which maximizes 
the dominant individual’s share of resources, given the subordinates’ outside                                                                    19 
options - joining other groups or remaining alone. As usual in the economic 
formalizations of the problem, the specificity of the investments enter the problem 
by modifying the agents’ outside options18. 
 To introduce some notation, let  ) , ( n k W s  indicate the production function with 
n representing the group size (not including the dominant individual), and 
[] , 1 , 0 = s k  s=G, L ,  the degree of investments’ specificity, respectively,  to the 
group or to a piece of land. For the moment, just assume  0 , 0
' ' ' < > n n W W , and 
W(1,n) > W (0, n). Then let  P(n) be the enforcement function, with  0
' > n P , and 
' '
n P > or <0 depending on whether specialization between producers and enforcers 
has already taken place or not. Finally, let  α W  and  ω W  respectively indicate the 
dominant and the subordinates shares of the total production, with  ' ω W ,  1 W  
representing the subordinates’ outside options, that is, their total ‘fitness’ in joining 
other groups or remaining alone. 
 Exploiting the material reviewed in the previous section, therefore, the three 
stages of the human evolution which the paper is concerned with can be described 
as follows:  
 
(i)  competitive-gathering equilibrium.  
 
In this stage, which in terminology of Hirshleifer (1995) can be called 
‘amorphy’ or scramble competition, groups form on the basis of occasional 
                                                 
18 See De Meza and Lockwood (1998), and Nicita (1999).                                                                    20 
benefits such as defense against predators, or the temporary availability of food 
resources. The absence of sophisticated communication abilities prevents both 
joint production and its separation from policing, not to speak of specialization. As 
a consequence, individual investments are generic with respect to both other 
people and the land they live on, and the economy is therefore based on simple 
gathering, with production, consumption and protection all performed in a single 
step. Except from the fluidity guaranteed by the fission-fusion mechanisms, no 
particular safeguards are in force, and politically the situation amounts to what we 
call now an Hobbesian state of nature with its characteristic ‘violence of all against 
all’. It is this physical difference among individuals in applying violence that, 
together with the associated operation of the free-exit option, determine  the 
distribution of goods and power in the ‘society’.  In short, every one takes what is 
able to gather and defend (fig. 2)19. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Remarkably, there is an analogy with competitive equilibria, especially  in the most modern 
versions in which traditional definitions –for instance, the availability of a large number of 
homogenous suppliers- are substituted with situations in which every individual simply leaves the 
others indifferent with respect to his presence or absence (Makowski and Ostroy, 2001). Of course, 
here there is no specialization, no recognized property rights and so no exchange. But there are 
opportunity costs –namely, in the choice between producing or predating- and so implicit prices and 
competitive pressures on behaviours. Hence a formulation in terms of equilibrium can be guessed 
behind life-time choices like those, for example, gorillas are faced with: ‘Most males either leave the 
natal group and become solitary,  or become subordinate followers in natal groups where they  may 
breed and may eventually become dominant.’ (Watts, 1996, p. 18). Albeit in a different context, the 





The three basic features of this politico-economic structure –the absence of 
joint production, of the separation between production and policing, and of 
economic specialization- can be described by the following three equations, 
admittedly the most crude among those to be discussed. The first gives total 
production (simply the sum of individuals’ net production), the second identifies 
the absence of specific investments with complete liberty to go, both ex ante and 
ex post20, and the third, incorporating the assumption of differences in physical 
force, illustrates the way production ends up to be distributed: 
                                                 
20 Outside options’ payoffs are fixed to a constant (x) for convenience but survival is not a necessary 
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)] ( ) 1 , 0 ( [
n
i
i i n P W , 
 
(2)  ω W =  ' ω W  =  1 W =x, 
 
(3)  x n n k W W * ) 1 * , ( − + = α >x, 
 
with n* such that  x Pn = ' . 
 
(ii)  egalitarian-hunting equilibrium. 
 
After the emergence of symbolic culture in the late Paleolithic, the new 
conditions represented by the capacity for mental representations of groups and the 
possibility of communication facilitate the beginning of joint production, that is, 
the passing from a gathering economy to hunting. In turn, as best exemplified by a 
collective and -in the relevant time horizon- irreversible decision such as to 
migrate in a particular place to hunt a particular prey21, this require group-specific 
investments in the sense that, after the decision, every hunter’s effort has more 
value in combination with that of the other group’s members than in alternative 
                                                 
21 It is important to note that hunter-gatherers communities remain fission-fusion societies. This is a 
necessary condition for the operation of group selection on individually disadvantageous but group 
beneficial traits (Sober and Wilson, 1998). The importance of collective decisions, crucial for survival 
in particular conditions, for advancing the relevance of group-selection is discussed in Boehm (1996). 
The basic reason why group-specificity increases the power of group selection is that it increases 
variation between groups and decreases variation within the group.                                                                    23 
uses but, inside the group, they are to a large extent fungible22. Lacking one-to-one 
lock-in, the hold-up threat a single hunter is faced with involves the entire group, 
and the consequent safeguards would require him eventually bossing the entire 
group. All the group’s hunters share the same problem, though. So the end result is 
the ex ante guarantee of the ex post group’s bossing over eventual individual 
deviations, as appropriately summarized by Boehm (1993) with the notion of 
‘reverse dominance hierarchy’. 
  More precisely for the present context, recalling that the hold-up threat 
refers to the renegotiation of previously agreed distributions, or to the diminished 
provision of quality or effort, the result is a norm which, regulating these two 
contingencies, functions as an investments’ safeguard against the two kinds of the 
hold-up problem group-specificity gives rise: one of the group against the 
individual, and the other of the individual against the group. In the first case, such 
a norm is enforced by the individual liberty to join other groups (a sort of micro-
foundation of groups). In the second, it is enforced by a group-selection evolved 
cultural constraint on the process of self-understanding (a sort of macro-foundation 
of individuals, see footnote 13)23. Together with the difficulties to attribute 
                                                 
22 This of course is not to deny differences in ability, which in fact are rewarded in related domains 
such as reproductive success (Kaplan and Hill, 1985). Not yet available surplus and specialization, 
however, such differences cannot accumulate socially and become so big  to justify, for example,  a 
team-production solution à la Alchian and Demsetz  (1972). 
23  The cognitive functions of institutions are a well-established phenomenon in the sociological 
institutionalism, though often confused with power issues (Douglas, 1986; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991). As for hunter-gatherers’ societies, it has to be noted that physical violence is mostly restricted to 
grave sexual crimes (Knauft, 1991). However, when violence is more generally interpreted as a 
variegated class of constraints on behavior, it presents at least overlapping domains with the concept of 
institution. In this respect, social cognitive neuroscience now allows to dub as naïve the two specular 
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individual merit and the positional characteristics mentioned in the Introduction, it 
is then possible to rationalize the absence of leadership and social stratification as 
the resulting egalitarian safeguards in the political realm. Collective moralistic 
aggression to curb innate tendencies to up-startism and free-riding is thus a 
coherent way to manage violence and enforce the implicit agreement, while 
sharing of large game meat, finally, is the natural distributional result which, in its 















                                                                                                                                            
while, on the other, the individual is an isolated and inaccessible unit (see Lieberman and Pfeifer, in 
press).                                                                    25 
As in the preceding case, the three following equations can be used to 
represent the two basic changes in the politico-economic structure – joint 
production and the separation between production and enforcement. While 
equation (4) mimics equation (1) in expressing total production, equations (5) and 
(6) summarize the group-specificity assumption (ex ante but not ex post liberty to 
go) and the egalitarian sharing rule. 
 
 (4)  ) 1 ( ) 1 , 1 ( ) 1 , ( + − + = = + n P n k W n k W G , 
 
(5)   α W =   ω W = ' ω W > 1 W =x, 
 






















α ,  
 
with  n* such that W’=P’, and P’’>0,  confirming that small numbers are a 
necessary condition for the whole arrangement. 
 
(iii)  specialized-stratified-agricultural equilibrium. 
 
Well after climate change prompted agricultural development and the 
consequent property rights revolution, naturally, people’s mobility  ended up by 
being restricted by the availability of reachable cultivable land. Hence the crucial 
disappearance of fission as a mechanisms to regulate conflicts.                                                                     26 
Together with the first appearance of a storable surplus, this implied another 
revolution in the division of labour, where producers and enforcers specialized in 
different jobs requiring different but bilaterally specific investments (fortified walls 
and irrigation systems, for example). Politically, the necessary safeguards for 
peasants amounted to being defended against internal and external raids, while for 
the ruling class they were the legitimate control of force. In turn, this arrangement 
implemented a distribution of the resources based on the payment of taxes for the 
part exceeding the subsistence needs from peasants to the ruling class,  so that  for 
the first time the accumulation property of social differences made the process 
largely irreversible. Accordingly, no claims to overall efficiency or simple 
exploitation can be supported by this scheme, except for the obvious facts 
represented by the its universal spreading as well as its continuing use of force 
against internal rebellions and for external conquest (fig. 4)24 . 
Formally, equations (7)-(9) represents the abandonment of joint production 
in favour of specialization, the required bilateral specific investments (no liberty to 
go, both ex ante and ex post), and the discussed distribution, which confirms the 
possibility of a U-shaped form for the evolution of despotism and inequality in 
human societies along the three stages under consideration. 
 
                                                 
24 Kaplan and Lancaster (2003, p.193) report calculations according to which fitness for peasants 
must have seen a remarkable increase in the passing from foraging societies to the first empires (hence 
ω W =  s>x in eq. 8). The work by Betzig (1986), and the subsequent arguments by Kaplan and 
Lancaster (2003), however, remind the enormous consequences of the empires’ status differences and 
confirm the validity of a prudent approach in evaluating their efficiency properties.                                                                    27 
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 (9)    ) ( * n P T n W − = α >s, 
 
with n* such that P’=T, and P’’<0 to confirm cloudiness in the issue of efficiency 
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4.Conclusion. 
 
  This paper presents a single framework for thinking of the evolution of 
human societies along its earliest stages. It is ambitious, in addition, because it 
emphasizes the two-way link between the economical,  the political, and the 
distributional sphere, and treats group-level institutional mechanisms to restrain 
behaviour and implement cooperation, along with the more familiar mechanisms 
represented by  competition and coercion. Because of methodological 
individualism and the separation between distribution and efficiency, these results 
are hardly a conclusion of the common economic approach to institutions but are 
critical to an interdisciplinary understanding of the evolutionary basis of modern 
societies. Admittedly, the nature of the subject implies that the ratio of evidence to 
interpretation is lower than usual, and so the main deficiency to be addressed is the 
lack of a rigorous formalization to better appreciate continuity and change in the 
passing from one stage to the other, as well as modifications in the relative 
importance of the different levels of selection. 
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